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The rise in neuroaesthetics laboratories across the globe has led to scores of exper-
iments designed to grasp people’s emotional, cognitive and perceptual responses
to artworks, yet few researchers have studied spectators experiencing visual art in
actual exhibitions. In 2015, Volker Kirchberg and Martin Tröndle published the
results of their five-year experiment, whereby they mapped the physiological, so-
cial, psychological and aesthetic experiences of ‘600 diverse persons with a designed
exhibition of classic modern and contemporary art as part of the Swiss national
research project eMotion’. Their study’s most counter-intuitive discovery is the
negligible role played by emotional response for those most engaged with artworks,
that is, those spectators who regularly assess, evaluate and judge artworks. Given
that not all appreciative attitudes reflect emotional responses, this paper concludes
that it would behoove researchers to study artworks that literally ‘move us’, causing
us to take action, shift perspectives and adopt new values.
I. INTRODUCTION: FROM EMOTION TO eMOTION
The rise in neuroaesthetics laboratories across the globe has led to scores of
experiments designed to grasp people’s emotional, cognitive and perceptual
responses to artworks, yet few researchers have studied spectators experienc-
ing visual art in actual exhibitions. In 2015, Volker Kirchberg and Martin
Tröndle published the results of their five-year experiment, whereby they
mapped the physiological, social, psychological and aesthetic experiences of
‘600 diverse persons with a designed exhibition of classic modern and con-
temporary art as part of the Swiss national research project eMotion’.1 Their
study’s most counter-intuitive discovery is the negligible role played by emo-
tional response for those most engaged with artworks, that is, those spectators
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who regularly assess, evaluate and judge artworks. Their results thus pose a
special challenge to philosophers who uphold the Affective Theory of Appre-
ciation, such that ‘When we appreciate works, the appreciation consists in an
emotional response’.2 It also defeats philosophical positions that presume a
‘standard viewer’, who responds to each artwork ‘monadically, savouring each
aesthetic experience as a unitary event’; consider aesthetic pleasure a univer-
sal value or neglect the artwork’s context and/or presentational history.3 In
contrast to philosophical views based on lab data, eMotion outcomes were
derived from people while actually experiencing artworks.
Data gathered from Kirchberg and Tröndle’s experiment led them to iden-
tify three ‘experience visitor types’, that of contemplative, enthusing and so-
cial viewers. Their findings could explain why 19th century philosopher Ed-
uard Hanslick changed his mind regarding music’s capacity to elicit emotional
responses. Having avowed music’s affective states, he reversed course in 1854,
claiming instead that music’s ‘sonically moved forms’ do not ‘arouse, express,
represent, or allude to human emotion’. If eMotion findings are correct, per-
haps he simply evolved from an enthusing listener into a contemplative one.
Additionally, eMotion findings confirm my earlier hunch that spectators are
drawn to different aspects of an exhibition. In the essay that accompanied the
‘2001 Northwest Annual’, I noted that visual, tactile, and narrative materi-
als stimulate ‘zombies’, whereas comparatively empty artworks lure ‘zealots’,
who need space to work their interpretive magic.4 In retrospect, zombies and
zealots anticipated eMotion’s enthusing and contemplative visitors, respec-
tively.5
In what follows, I begin by describing Jesse Prinz’s oft-cited Affective
Theory of Appreciation. Given eMotion’s claim that only enthusiasts exhibit
emotional responses, I worry that Prinz’s paper is misleading, since it overes-
timates emotion’s role for aesthetic appreciation. For example, he claims that
‘[p]eople who lack strong positive emotions tend to have less appreciation for
aesthetic experiences than others’, yet eMotion findings prove just the oppo-
site.6 He compares such reactions to anhedonics who consider sunsets greatly
overrated or people afflicted with alexithymia who find transcribing feelings
difficult. I then discuss eMotion results in greater detail so that readers have
a greater understanding of how this experiment was conducted and its results.
I conclude that values drive passions, while passions (pinpointed by brain
researchers as emotions) signal values. This view is consistent with psycho-
logical research that demonstrates that images of disgusting objects seen as
artworks (imaginary) are more palatable than those seen as educational doc-
umentary materials (real).7 Images of disgusting real things effect wildly dif-
ferent values that diminish appreciation. Researchers bent on connecting ap-
preciative attitudes to emotional responses rarely distinguish emotions from
passions, yet the latter are value-driven (drives, not gut reactions). More-
over, they tend to conflate art appreciation with aesthetic experience, though
these are incomparable. Artworks that inspire our passions literally ‘move
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us’, causing us to take action, shift perspectives and adopt new values. The
more Hanslick analysed music’s ‘sonically moving forms’, the more his values
changed, enabling him to become a contemplative listener.
II. PRINZ’S AFFECTIVE THEORY OF APPRECIATION
In ‘Emotion and Aesthetic Value’, Prinz makes three pronouncements that
eMotion experiments have since disproven. 1) ‘Introspection and neuroimag-
ing support the conclusions that emotions arise when we have positive aes-
thetic experiences’.8 2) ‘These studies establish a link between moods and
aesthetic appreciation, and given the close link between moods and emo-
tion it is plausible that emotion induction would have an impact as well’.9
3) ‘These personality traits can be interpreted, at least in part, as emotional
dispositions, and consequently, these findings point to a link between emotion
and preference’.10 Regarding his second point, I imagine that ‘emotion induc-
tion’ is what psychologists call ‘priming’, an added stimulus that manipulates
people’s ordinary preferences. Given the allure of famous paintings, eMo-
tion experiments indicate that reputations prime no differently than flashing
money, celebrity endorsements or flattering comments. Thus, the euphoria
associated with experiencing famous paintings is likely artificially-induced via
one’s associations with the ‘prime’, not some assessment of the artwork. That
is, knowing that an artwork is expensive, historically significant or highly-
regarded induces appreciation, which not incidentally impresses enthusing
visitors. Contrary to findings associated with contemplative and social visi-
tors, Prinz concludes, ‘These studies are all different, but they suggest that
some of the areas that show up in emotion studies are also major players
[emphasis mine] in aesthetic response’.11
For Prinz, aesthetic appreciation entails a ‘two-stage model’, whereby the
first stage is response and the second is assessment, but as eMotion studies
indicate, people tend either to respond or assess. He attributes the first stage
to perceptual factors, which he admits are affected by top-down knowledge
and implicit biases for ‘certain compositional features’.12 The second stage
reflects evaluators’ aesthetic values, those unconscious ‘rules stored in long-
term memory that can be schematized’.13 ‘Assessment is an affective process’,
since one tabulates an artwork’s overall goodness (or badness) by subtract-
ing its ‘bad-making features’ from its ‘good-making features’, a process that
arouses positive and/or negative feelings.14 This leads him to claim, ‘Any
feature that we regard as good, whether consciously or unconsciously, con-
tributes a bit of emotion’.15 Moreover, ‘Each feature that we assess in this
way contributes to the total emotional state that results from our encounter
with the work, and the valence and intensity of that total emotional state
ordinarily constitutes our aesthetic appraisal’.16
One might wonder why Prinz ever suspected that emotions underlie re-
sponse and assessment. He began his 2011 article by referencing scores of lab
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experiments linking people’s experiencing ‘beautiful’ images to their exhibit-
ing brain responses indicative of emotions.17 He writes, ‘There is evidence
that emotions co-occur with art appreciation’, which grounds his notion of
aesthetic appreciation.18 He claims that ‘introspection’ shows this, since peo-
ple invariably describe art experiences as ‘invigorating, stimulating and ex-
hausting’.19 Problem is, there’s no telling what qualities researchers used to
assess ‘beautiful’ images. Most likely, they flashed images of art-historically
significant paintings, whose beauty owes more to recognition than actual as-
sessment. It’s thus difficult to discern whether people’s positive emotional
responses reflect appreciation, priming or familiarity. If as Prinz claims, we
store unconscious rules for evaluating artworks in our memories, then unfa-
miliar artworks that lack appropriate rules cannot stimulate appreciation, let
alone arouse emotional responses. If this is correct, contemporary art is a
non-starter.
Although Prinz backs up his views with scientific data, I view this research
with suspicion, not because it was primarily collected by quickly flashing
photographs of artworks in labs, but because such experiments confuse sub-
jects’ preferences with aesthetic appreciation. People need not assess their
preferences, but aesthetic appreciation usually takes time. He cites James
Cutting’s use of Impressionist paintings as background images for psychol-
ogy slides. Cutting’s students expressed a preference for the lesser known
examples, whose popularity he boosted by projecting them more often. Prinz
deduces, ‘familiarity induces positive affect and positive affect increases pref-
erence’.20 He continues, ‘If this interpretation is right, Cutting’s result adds
further support to the claim that preference is linked to affective states’. It’s
hardly surprising that familiar artworks arouse positive feelings, since their
assessment requires far less cognitive effort. It thus seems that accompany-
ing feelings reflect subjective preferences more than aesthetic appreciation.
Perhaps such feelings signal stability, security and/or serenity, owing to their
familiarity. Most problematic, lab experiments presume artwork neutrality,
such that artworks alone trigger physical responses; yet as Prinz admits, myr-
iad external factors are actually at play, such as thematic frames, context,
background information and cultural conditioning, a view originated by John
Dewey’s Art as Experience (1934) and reasserted by Leder et al.(2004).
Komar and Melamid’s ‘Most Wanted Paintings’ project (1995) illustrates
how radically diverse people’s painting preferences/aversions are across four-
teen countries and the web. Prinz cites this survey, yet he attributes these
differences to the fact that people ‘can be conditioned differently in different
cultural settings. Differences in taste are easier to pin on differences in pas-
sions rather than differences in beliefs –it’s far from clear what the relevant
beliefs would be’.21 While measuring people’s passions may be scientifically
easier than getting them to articulate their beliefs, it’s not clear what causes
said passions other than underlying beliefs, as experiments devised to elicit
subjects’ preferences show. For example, Komar and Melamid discovered that
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the Dutch have a unique preference for abstract paintings, yet everybody else
wants what resemble 16th Century Flemish paintings.22 To demonstrate cul-
tural conditioning, Prinz offers the example of Americans shooting close-ups
of a seated model, whereas Japanese photographers depict the model in a
scene.23 As we shall see, this difference could also reflect divergent values
regarding the need for vanishing points, the photographer’s privilege or the
significance of context/background environments.
Prinz credits Peter Goldie with doubting that assessment is an affective
process.24 He continues, Goldie’s worry ‘seems hard to reconcile with the fact
that we often give reasons for our appraisals of art. The view just sketched,
wherein we begin by tabulating units of positive emotions, seems insufficiently
cognitive. We don’t justify our positive appraisals of art by just saying how
good they make us feel: we offer arguments. This suggests that a cognitive
approach is at work, even if emotions play a role’.25 To my lights, the reasons
people give actually reflect values underlying their appraisals (beliefs), rather
than affective feelings, so there could be a moral dimension as well. Consider
the earlier case dealing with images of disgusting things that disgust viewers
if real, yet fascinate if imaginary.
If art lovers are ‘reason shoppers’ as Kevin Melchionne contends, then
Prinz’s view has another problem.26 Melchionne remarks that ‘reason shop-
pers’ are not only searching for good reasons, but they are just as appreciative
of good reasons as they are the objects under consideration. He attributes the
quest for interesting reasons as the primary motivation behind contemporary
creativity. He considers reasons to ‘have their own beauty, which is easily
confused with the works themselves. At times, what art world insiders are
unwittingly experiencing are the reasons rather than the works themselves’.27
When we identify with the reasons, reasons also prime. One might say that art
institutions, whether museums or art schools, are in the ‘business’ of publicis-
ing reasons, priming people to procure new values. As the next section makes
clear, Prinz’s two-stage model merges enthusing (emotionally-responsive) and
contemplative (evaluative) experience types.
III. EXHIBITION EXPERIENCES:
EMOTION AFTER eMOTION
What makes the eMotion experiment relevant is that participants experienced
actual artworks, as they freely moved about Kunstmuseum St. Gallen. Not
only did the experiment track participants’ paths and time spent in front of
each artwork/label, but it measured their heart rate and skin conductance.
Keen to understand what drives the aforementioned three experience visitor
types, they evaluated six factors: pre-visit expectations, socio-demographic
characteristics, personal-relatedness to art, visitor’s mood prior to visiting,
post-visit assessment and potential social dynamics.28 Of 576 visitors, 24
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provided insufficient data, yet fully 84.6% of the remaining 552 subjects fell
into one of the types introduced at this paper’s onset.29
While participants’ pre-visit surveys anticipated ‘surprise, sensitisation
and reflection’, their post-visit evaluations credited ‘fame, familiarity and
silence’, suggesting a slight asymmetry between bold expectations and [con-
ventional] experiences.30 When evaluated for each of the three types, how-
ever, the researchers concluded that expectations hadn’t clouded assessments,
which closely tracked their type.31 Additionally, they found no correlation
between pre-visit mood and exhibition experience, which contradicts Prinz’s
premise regarding mood’s role for aesthetic appreciation, noted above.32 Re-
garding socio-demographic characteristics, occupation (more likely age, in my
view) appears to play a role, as teachers tend to be contemplative visitors,
while students are typically enthusing types.
To evaluate participants’ emotional reactions, exit surveys requested that
they grade nine statements regarding ten exhibited artworks from 1 to 5
(strongly agree) along the lines of: ‘This artwork. . . pleased me, made me
laugh, surprised me, made me think, moved me emotionally, frightened me,
made me angry, made me happy, made me sad’.33 As one can already see,
what researchers consider ‘emotional reactions’ align with what respondents
likely value as art’s role/potentialities, what Prinz terms aesthetic values.
People who don’t value ‘thinking’ or ‘laughing’ are unlikely to relate to art-
works on these terms. Additionally, ‘[v]ariables of the visitor’s cognitive re-
actions were constructed from the visitor’s gradings of these eight aspects
of the artwork: content/topic, artistic technique, composition, beauty, the
artist, its importance in art history, presentation of the artwork, its connec-
tion/correspondence to the other artworks in the exhibition’.34
The researchers’ next step confirms my view that visitors’ gradings re-
flect core values, though not necessarily emotional responses; otherwise it
wouldn’t make sense to create indices by averaging people’s assessments of
ten extremely different artworks. ‘For each visitor, we then calculated nine
emotional and eight cognitive index variables by averaging the personal assess-
ments of all artworks’.35 The researchers remarked, ‘Heart-rate variability was
found to be generally associated with “aesthetic quality” (the work is rated
pleasing, beautiful; emotionally moving; well-done with respect to technique,
composition, and content; artist and importance in art history) and “sur-
prise/laughter”. . . and weakly associated with “curatorial quality”’.36 More-
over, ‘skin conductance variabilities are described as indicators of emotional
processes. Tröndle and Tschacher (2012) found correlations with the factor
“dominance” (the work is experienced as dominant; stimulating)’. 37 They
conclude, ‘The physiological responses of visitors are significantly related to
their aesthetic/emotional assessments’.38
On first glance, Kirchberg and Tröndle’s conclusion resembles Prinz’s posi-
tion that emotions co-occur with aesthetic appreciation, ‘appreciation has an
emotional uniformity’ and ‘the second stage necessarily involves emotions’.39
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Problem is, contemplative viewers totally appreciate art, yet they fail to ex-
hibit emotional engagement. According to Kirchberg and Tröndle, ‘Deeply
thinking about the arts, being moved by it, assessing the interaction with the
other exhibited works, and considering the specificities of selecting the other
artworks are all part of a contemplative experience’.40
Contemplative types claim to ‘be moved’, yet they remain emotionally un-
moved. ‘Generally speaking, the physiological reactions of the contemplative
viewer are weaker than the other two visitor types. . . . Emotionally, they do
not engage heavily’. Although contemplative types exhibit less intense phys-
iological reactions, they deeply connect with individual artworks, improve
their understanding and evaluate both artworks and the exhibition.41
The enthusing visitor, who visibly exhibits ‘more heart-rate markers. . . and
more significant fluctuations of the skin conductivity’, ‘is driven by an “aha-
effect” – wandering around, recognising famous and important artworks, be-
ing emotionally aroused’.42 For this type, ‘fame and beauty go hand in hand’
as if the former is criteria for the latter.43 ‘For the enthusing type of visi-
tor, his or her emotional reactions to the selected works are highly significant
and positively related to this dimension of exhibition experience; . . . for hap-
piness; . . . for sadness. . . .Only one cognitive assessment, beauty, is found to
also affect the enthusing visitor significantly and positively’.44 Apparently,
knowledge about art positively impacts their experiences.45 By contrast,
‘[t]here is one emotional reaction to the selected artworks that impacts the
social-experience visitor: “This artwork made me laugh”’.46 The social visi-
tor rather identifies with his/her companion(s), achieving togetherness with
friends or family. They accept the artworld’s ‘star system’ and acknowledge
fame and recognition, yet are ‘negatively impacted’ by an artwork’s content.
Not only do contemplative visitors visibly lack emotional responses, but
enthusing visitors’ reactions are especially vulnerable to priming, since an
artwork’s familiarity due to fame or historical significance is likely to trig-
ger emotional responses. Most worrisome for Prinz’s view is the fact that
contemplative viewers appreciate evaluation, yet exhibit little emotional en-
gagement. On this level, their behaviour resembles that of reason shoppers,
who enjoy thinking about an artwork’s significance as much as they enjoy
actually experiencing it.
IV. CONCLUSION: AN ALTERNATIVE ROLE FOR
EMOTION
In 2000, I curated a traveling retrospective for Los Angeles artist Eileen
Cowin. In my accompanying essay, ‘The Impossibility of Expression’, I noted
that I could name only two other contemporary photographers who dared
to explore emotions: Bill Viola and Sam Taylor-Johnson (years before her
Crying Men (2004) series).47 Contemporary artists assiduously avoid obvi-
ously emotional content, largely because such approaches risk manipulating
128
Sue Spaid
viewers (hardly exemplary of Brechtian distanciation). If eMotion findings
that art cognoscente exhibit few emotional reactions is correct, then why
are neuroscientists and philosophers so keen to reinstate it? Consider Aaron
Smuts’ decade-long philosophical work on the significance of sad songs and
why people seek out painful art. Given the growth industry of neuroscience
labs with handy gadgets, Prinz’s remark that it’s easier to pinpoint emotions
than beliefs seems about right.
Although Kirchberg and Tröndle’s tracking people’s heart rates and skin
conductivity as they move about exhibitions is wildly different than earlier re-
searchers’ identifying ‘activations’ of brain regions associated with emotions,
both groups aimed to identify the significance of emotional responses. In
contrast to earlier lab experiments, eMotion results suggest that it’s actu-
ally quite difficult to pinpoint emotional responses even if skin conductance
is a good indicator. Not only is priming a huge problem that remains in-
adequately addressed in the literature, but testing for emotional responses
ignores contemplative and social visitors. Finally, eMotion surveys suggest
that inviting viewers to appraise artworks (beliefs) on a five-point scale eases
their ability to identify personal values.
Prinz’s claim that those ‘lacking strong positive emotions tend to have
less appreciation for aesthetic experiences than others’ is not only false, but
it oddly excludes those zealots (whether art cognescenti or ‘reason shoppers’)
who likely have the most to say about art, and largely drive its conversation.
And here I am reminded of the time I was invited to jury ‘Minumental 14’
(2001). For this annual contest, Art Academy of Cincinnati students and
faculty submit sculptures no larger than 5 x 5 x 5 cm. As remuneration for
my jurying, I was invited to select 3 for my personal collection. Being the
juror, I scored each object from 1 to 10 in pertinent categories and then tallied
points to find 3 winners. And then I chose the 3 that I wanted to keep for the
rest of my life. Since it seemed hypocritical that my ‘rational’ system totally
neglected my ‘handpicked’ favourites, I reassigned mine the actual winners.
As Blaise Pascal famously said, ‘the heart has its reasons, which reason does
not know’.
This asymmetry illustrates what Melchionne calls the ‘fallibility of rea-
sons’, since my reasons couldn’t explain my preferences. Prinz and his ilk
are likely to claim that ‘my 3’ elicited greater emotional reactions. Were I
a ‘reason shopper’, I’d likely defend my top scorers to death. My selection
process rather suggests that values supersede assessment (tabulating pros and
cons). Moreover, committing to keep something forever trumps rationality,
and explains why most museums forbid deaccession, even if it’s clearly the
most reasonable option. For sure, appreciative attitudes prove key, yet it re-
mains unclear what drives them. Is it beauty, priming, familiarity, emotions,
reasons or values? The eMotion survey suggests that appreciative attitudes
track core or emergent values. For example, some people are driven to con-
strue otherwise ineffable artworks, while others believe that creativity itself
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must be protected at all costs. As Melchionne notes, thoughts can be discon-
nected from objects under reflection.
Emotion responses signal values, but they are not sine qua non. What
people go to bat for is what they truly value, and thus appreciate. From my
two-decades experience working with artists to implement ecoventions, which
sorely lack the beauty and fame to ‘move’ enthusiast types, I have witnessed
such artworks’ fundamentally altering people’s beliefs about the artist’s role
in society and ‘degraded’ nature’s transformational capacity.48 And when
people’s beliefs change, so do their core values. Changed values move people.49
Rather than look for a connection between appreciative attitudes and ‘strong
positive emotions’, researchers should track the connection between aesthetic
appreciation and values, which coheres with eMotion’s findings.
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